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Human Factors in the Mississippi Floods
A 390 A 390 A 390The Mississippi River breaks through a levee between
the Illinois towns of Quincy and Meyer, 18 June 2008.
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I
t’s happened again. For the third time in 15
years the Mississippi River massively burst its
banks this spring, inundating tiny Missouri
towns such as Winfield (population 720) and Foley
(population 178), causing potentially billions of
dollars’ worth of destruction—although the damages
are still being assessed—and hiking corn prices to
$8.00 a bushel in the wake of the lost crop. On
22 April 2008 scientists with the U.S. Geological
Survey (USGS) measured the largest water volume
on the lower Mississippi River since 1973, with a
flow of 1.8 million ft3/sec, enough to fill more than
20 Olympic-size swimming pools in 1 second.
The environmental fallout from the 2008 floods
is still being assessed. The danger of floodwater is
not simply that its level is too high, says Robert
Criss, a geologist at Washington University.
“Floodwaters are heavily polluted with sewage and
filth, commonly bearing counts of coliforms, fecal
Streptococcus, and other bacteria of many thousands
per deciliter,” he explains. “The waters are laden
with contaminants including agrochemicals, oils,
detergents, and toxic metals. They are highly turbid,
typically bearing particulate loads a hundredfold or
more higher than normal river waters.” Those pollu-
tants, contaminants, and sediments can be carried
into homes, where the lingering dampness promotes
mold growth. Moreover, floodwater pools trapped
behind failed levees serve as breeding grounds for
mosquitoes, flies, and other disease vectors. 
Meanwhile, observers are asking how such devas-
tating floods could have occurred again so soon. The
massive flooding is attributed largely to torrential
spring rains in the Upper Mississippi Valley, which
Paul Rydlund, a supervisory hydrologist with the
USGS Missouri Water Science Center, says were
even greater than those preceding the record-
breaking 1993 Midwest flood. But as heavy as those
rains were, the question in the minds of some is
whether they were made worse by structures such as
levees and other man-made interventions wrought
upon the Mississippi River over time.The Hand of Man
Changes to the river are hardly a latter-day
phenomenon. John Anfinson, a historian
with the National Park Service’s Mississippi
National River and Recreation Area, notes
that the early French explorers of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries recognized
that to capture the economic potential of the
Mississippi “you have to harness the river;
you have to make it behave.” That harness-
ing began with the settlement of New
Orleans in the early 1700s, where the
first levees were thrown up to create a
city that actually lies below sea level.
Thereafter, Anfinson says, “The levee
system started growing upriver and
the navigation system [i.e., dredging
and channeling endeavors] started
growing downriver.”
In the centuries that followed,
shipping and agricultural interests
pressed Congress to allow alteration of
the river. Deepening channels made
shipping easier, and construction of
levees permitted farming and the
establishment of towns and cities along
the river’s banks. 
Many experts point to levees as a
major culprit in flood devastation.
Levees narrow the flow of the water,
preventing it from spreading out into
the floodplain and forcing it to move
faster, explains geologist Jeffrey Mount,
who directs the Center for Watershed
Sciences at the University of California,
Davis. As a bolus of floodwater moves
down a river, levees can get over-
whelmed in their work. “The dark
secret that no one wants to share is that
there are two kinds of levees: those that
have failed and those that will fail,”
Mount says. And when that levee fails
with a massive wall of water pressing
on it, the water rushes with great force
onto the land behind the levee. “The
power of water is a function of the dif-
ference in elevation between the top of
the water and the adjacent land,”
Mount explains. “So the greater that
difference, the more powerful the flow that
comes out onto that land in terms of its veloc-
ity and its power to erode.” 
Wing dams on the river are another fac-
tor in exacerbating floods, says Criss. These
rock jetties, situated roughly perpendicular
to the riverbank, aid shipping by preventing
the accumulation of sediment so the river
channel stays deeper. Deeper water moves
faster, meaning the impact of floods can be
greater. 
Criss points to another problem: “There
are general changes to the land that decrease
the permeability of soils. As we convert our
forests and prairies and fields to subdivisions,
we increase the rate of runoff [into the
river]—that’s the ubiquitous footprint of
man.” According to geologist Nicholas Pinter
of Southern Illinois University Carbondale,
one particular land use change is quite seri-
ous—tile drainage. Because many agricultural
soils are too poorly drained to naturally serve
as good farmland, farmers install subsurface
drains (“tiles”). “When it rains,” Pinter says,
“the water comes out of farm fields faster
than it would otherwise.” 
Ripe for Disaster?
Land development in floodplains is a perilous
exercise, according to Gerald Galloway, a
professor of engineering at the University of
Maryland and former commander of the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE).
For one thing, he says, developers rely heavily
on floodplain maps issued by the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
that demarcate where we can expect so-called
100-year floods—the sort of flood that can
be expected once every 100 years. People
erroneously believe if they are outside that
demarcation they are safe. However,
Galloway cautions, such maps are estimates
only. Moreover, he says, “The records of the
past don’t necessarily match the pattern we’re
in right now in terms of the weather.”
Criss agrees, saying that the rivers of
today are not the rivers of the past, and that
there is simply not enough historical infor-
mation on which to base the notion of a 100-
or 500-year flood. Besides, at many places, he
argues that what have been called 100-year
floods are now 10-year floods due to a com-
bination of changing conditions over time.
Larry Buss, who chairs the USACE
National Nonstructural/Flood Proofing
Committee, says that when a levee is
built in compliance with the require-
ments of the National Flood Insur-
ance Program, there is no longer any
floodplain management in the area
behind the levee. All kinds of new
development can then occur in the
area landward of the levee as if the
floodplain no longer exists—when in
fact it does. 
“Politically, it’s more acceptable if
politicians come to people and say
‘I’m going to remove the flood threat
from you by supporting building a
levee so you can live in that floodplain
as if the floodplain no longer existed
even though flood risk remains,’” Buss
says. “That’s more politically accept-
able than telling them ‘I’m supporting
a buyout’ or ‘I’m supporting a reloca-
tion plan where we’ll move you to
high ground and have you safe from
floods forever.’” However, when the
levee does have a problem, the dam-
ages are much greater than they might
have been because of the increased
development in vulnerable areas.
Buss says the U.S. approach to lev-
ees has been too focused on what he
calls short-term economic/political
gain that is ultimately transformed
into long-term economic/political loss
when major flooding results in levee
failure or overtopping and then cata-
strophic flood damages and perhaps
loss of life. In these cases, he says, there
is a major disconnect between those who
make land use decisions (i.e., local communi-
ties) and those who pay for the ill-starred
consequences of those decisions (i.e., state
and federal taxpayers).
The Role of the Corps
Noting the impact of man-made modifica-
tions of the river, critics question the judg-
ment of the USACE in carrying out such
modifications. “The Corps comes in with a
community-by-community project with
measures like levees, and it looks at that
levee; it doesn’t look at the whole Mississippi
as a system. And that’s a problem,” says
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The Mississippi River snakes through downtown
LaGrange, Missouri, 21 June 2008. Many engineers and
floodplain managers believe the risks that come with
siting towns in floodplains are unacceptably high.
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nLarry Larson, executive director of the
Association of State Floodplain Managers. 
Pinter charges that the USACE has failed
to examine the possibility of elevated flood
risk in many navigational engineering pro-
jects, including a $5.3 million project in
2007 to construct three arc-shaped chevrons
and other structures in the St. Louis Harbor
area. The chevrons work much like wing
dams, but they are located wholly in the
river rather than extending from the shore.
Composed of rock, they are designed to
lessen the need for continual dredging of St.
Louis Harbor, deepen the river bottom, and
straighten the flow of the river. 
“The benefit of those structures was cal-
culated versus their cost,” says Pinter. “The
benefit was reduced dredging to help main-
tain the navigation channel. The cost was
the construction cost with no calculation
whatsoever of the additional financial cost in
terms of elevated flood risk.”
But Robert Davinroy, chief of river engi-
neering at the Corps’ St. Louis office, says the
USACE did examine the question of elevated
flood risk. “We know how these structures
work,” he says. “They’re submerged by about
twelve feet when the river gets to flood stage—
they have no effect on flood heights.” He adds
there are no data to show the chevrons have
any effect on the height of floods.
As far as levees go, Galloway argues that
the USACE is quite interested in understand-
ing the impact of these structures on floods.
“In the greater St. Louis area the Corps has
been asking [Congress] for money for a study
to see what is the cumulative effect of a lot of
little levees. So far they haven’t gotten the
money. People are not as much interested in
learning that sort of information as they are
in building levees,” says Galloway, referring
to those legislators and constituents who view
levees as flood protection. For example, a
20 September 2007 article in Time magazine
that sharply criticizes a USACE flood control
project in Missouri notes that Senator Kit
Bond (R–MO) and Representative Jo Ann
Emerson (R–MO) were responsible for push-
ing the project through.
Politics and pressure do play significant
roles in the selection of which projects to
fund, notes Representative Eddie Bernice
Johnson (D–TX), who chairs the Water
Resources and Environment Subcommittee of
the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee. For instance, she says the
USACE might initially say that a given pro-
ject is not necessary. “The next time around
they’ve been under so much pressure, they’ll
go along with it. I’ve seen that happen,” she
asserts. She says the pressure comes from local
citizens through their representatives for pro-
jects that “shouldn’t be funded,” and the
prospects for changing the system are dim. 
Moreover, Galloway observes that when
Congress authorizes a USACE project, the
money for it is quickly appropriated. But
when it comes to appropriating money to
remedy any environmental problems result-
ing from the project, Congress is very slow
to allocate funds, an observation Johnson
says is “probably true.”
A 2005 Government Accountability
Office report titled Wetlands Protection:
Corps of Engineers Does Not Have an Effective
Oversight Approach to Ensure That Compen-
satory Mitigation Is Occurring took the
Corps’ mitigation efforts to task when it
comes to restoring wetlands as part of miti-
gation efforts, labeling USACE guidelines as
“vague and internally inconsistent.” How-
ever, by the time the same office  issued the
2008 report Compensatory Mitigation for
Losses of Aquatic Resources, mitigation efforts
had reportedly improved and the USACE
was meeting mitigation requirements except
for the stipulation that any concern voiced
about a project receive a 60-day review.
A New Approach to Managing Floods
From the perspective of the USACE, atti-
tudes toward floods have been evolving into
what Buss describes as a more “holistic”
approach focused on reducing flood risk
with the realization that floods will occur.
This approach considers all flood risk reduc-
tion tools including not just levees but also
buyouts and relocations. Buss says many
professional flood risk experts believe the
nation should consider levees only as a last
resort after first considering measures such as
buyouts, relocations, elevation, and zoning.
Using floodplains for any development
other than farms is simply asking for trouble,
asserts Criss. “Floodplain development
should be recognized as geologically stupid,
economically unwise, environmentally harm-
ful, and pernicious to mankind,” he says. 
Agriculture, however, can make valuable
use of the floodplain. Farms in the bottom-
lands of rivers tend to be quite productive,
says Galloway, whereas “when you start
farming in hill country, you’re back to the
erosion problems we had in the thirties.”
However, some farms are located at especially
precarious points along the river—for exam-
ple, in the former channel of the river. He
proposes that such farms be bought out and
the levees taken down. But that of course
depends on whether the owner of the farm-
land is willing to sell.
Galloway also proposes changing levees
that protect farms so they are open to the
river at certain times, as a way to reduce
flood damage. It’s an idea that Peter
Rabbon, program director of the Corps’
National Flood Risk Management Program,
says has merit. One way to implement this
idea would be to build an overflow system
(or “flowage easement”) into a levee, which
Rabbon says would allow water to flow onto
farmland in a controlled way. 
“This idea has been talked about for
ages,” says Mount. “The wisest and best use
of these floodplains is farms, rather than
cities, because during the hydrologic emer-
gencies [floods] you can store water on
those farms, creating a modest amount of
dislocation rather than catastrophe. A wise
society compensates the farmer for saving it
billions of dollars in damages,” he says.
Flowage easements are gradually being
introduced, he says. 
One of the most celebrated buyouts
recently was that of Valmeyer, Illinois. The
community of 900 souls was devastated by
the 1993 Mississippi flood, the latest in a
series of inundations endured by that com-
munity since 1910. The community moved
to higher ground nearby, an effort involving
22 government agencies and a cost in the
range of $28 million. In the process of
rebuilding, the people of Valmeyer incorpo-
rated several sustainable design elements into
their new town, including energy-efficient
construction and passive solar technology.
But such efforts, says Buss, demand strong
community leadership with long-term
vision—something that can be hard to find. 
Whether relocations such as Valmeyer’s
will be seen as a result of this year’s flood is
still uncertain. Money and leadership are
both needed. But recent and future legisla-
tion may force at least partial change.
Representative James Oberstar (D–MN),
who chairs the House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee, notes that the
2007 $23 billion Water Resources
Development Act “requires that national
water resources planning avoid the unwise
use of floodplains and flood-prone areas and
requires the President to report by 2010 on
national vulnerability to flood damages.”
The 2007 legislation also addresses the fund-
ing of mitigation efforts by stipulating that if
mitigation is required for a particular con-
struction project, then it must be carried out
before or concurrently with that project. 
This year’s proposed water resource legis-
lation also includes a number of other provi-
sions to reduce flood damage, such as creating
incentives to limit development in flood-
plains, investing in natural buffers such as
wetlands, and pursuing technology for
improved understanding of flooding threats.
“As we move forward with the next [Water
Resources Development Act] bill, we will
continue to look for ways to better ensure
that mitigation is carried out where and when
it is required,” Oberstar says.
Harvey Black
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